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Abstract
The prevalent interpretation of Go¨del’s Second Theorem states that
a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory T does not prove its con-
sistency. In this paper, we will re-examine the justification of this philo-
sophical interpretation. Detlefsen’s Stability Problem challenges such a
justification by requiring that every sentence (in the language of T ) ex-
pressing T -consistency has to be shown to be unprovable in T . We will
argue that the usual attempts to meet this challenge do not provide a
satisfactory solution, since they employ specific Go¨del numberings, which
can be seen as arbitrarily chosen “coordinate systems” in the process of
arithmetisation. A satisfactory solution to the Stability Problem there-
fore has to be based on a more general version of Go¨del’s Second Theorem
independent of such a coordinate system. We will propose such a solu-
tion by proving the invariance of Go¨del’s Second Theorem with regard to
acceptable numberings.
1 Introduction
According to the prevalent philosophical interpretation of Go¨del’s Second The-
orem, a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory T does not prove its con-
sistency. Detlefsen’s Stability Problem (Detlefsen, 1986) challenges the jus-
tification of this interpretation by requiring that every L-formula expressing
T -consistency has to be shown to be unprovable in T .1 Detlefsen (1986) states:
[one] must locate a set C of conditions on formulæ of T (T now
being treated also as the system in which the syntax of T is to be
represented) such that (1) every formula of T that can reasonably
be said to express the consistency of T satisfies the conditions in C,
and (2) no formula of T that satisfies C can be proven in T provided
that T is consistent. (p. 93)
The classical approach to meeting Detlefsen’s challenge proceeds in three
steps. Firstly, a set PT of conditions is isolated such that every L-formula
∗grabmayb@hu-berlin.de
1Throughout this paper we consider consistent and recursively enumerable theories formu-
lated in the arithmetical language L = {‘0’, ‘S’, ‘ + ’, ‘ · ’}.
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that can reasonably be said to express T -provability satisfies PT . Secondly,
“construction-principles” C are given, turning L-formulæ into L-sentences, such
that every L-sentence that can reasonably be said to express the consistency of
T is constructed by a principle of C from a formula satisfying the conditions in
PT (in short: satisfies C[PT ]). Finally, a generalised version of Go¨del’s Second
Theorem is proven, showing that no L-formula satisfying C[PT ] is T -provable,
provided that T is consistent.
In what follows, this classical approach is re-examined. Since the principles
usually employed for PT and C are dependent on specific arbitrarily chosen
Go¨del numberings, they are, as we will argue, not sufficient to satisfy clause
(1) of the Stability Problem. In section 2 we propose alternative formulations
of both PT and C and observe that the classical version of Go¨del’s Second
Theorem does not suffice to establish clause (2) of the Stability Problem. A
more general “numbering sensitive” version of Go¨del’s Second Theorem is thus
called for, establishing its invariance with regard to acceptable numberings.
We discuss the notion of a numbering’s acceptability in section 3, where we
argue that computability is a necessary condition for the acceptability of a
numbering. We then introduce a precise notion of computability, allowing the
informal invariance claim to be restated as a (meta-)mathematical theorem,
which is proved in section 4. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks.
The present work may be viewed as in line with other attempts to eliminate
arbitrary choices in the process of arithmetisation. Visser (2011) locates three
sources of indeterminacy in the formalisation of a consistency statement for a
theory T :
(I) the choice of a proof system;
(II) the choice of a Go¨del numbering;
(III) the choice of a specific formula representing the axiom set of T .
According to Visser (2011), “Feferman’s solution (Feferman, 1960) to deal
with the indeterminacy is to employ a fixed choice for (I) and (II) and to make
(III) part of the individuation of the theory” (p. 544). Visser’s (2011) own ap-
proach rests on fixed choices for (II) and (III) but is independent of (I). The
primary result of the present work is to eliminate the dependency on (II).
Technical Preliminaries. In the context of Go¨del’s Second Theorem,
we take any “sufficiently adequate” L-theory to extend the Tarski-Mostowski-
Robinson theory R.2 Define x ≤ y ≡ ∃z z + x = y. The theory R is given by
the following axiom schemata:
R1 m+ n = m+ n
R2 m · n = m · n
R3 m 6= n, for m 6= n
R4 x ≤ n→ ∨k≤n x = k
R5 x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x
2See (Tarski et al., 1953, p. 53). This more general framework was suggested to us by
Albert Visser. For further information about R the reader may also consult (Visser, 2014).
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2 Criteria of Expressibility
Classically, the meaning of an L-formula is taken to be its model-theoretic in-
terpretation over the standard model N. For instance, the formula ∃y(2 · y = x)
expresses the property of being an even natural number. However, through
the process of arithmetisation a second layer of meaning can be assigned to
L-formulæ. By taking an extensional3 stance on metamathematics, we neither
assume that the provable equivalence of two L-sentences in some specific theory
is necessary, nor sufficient for them to express the same syntactic statement. In
order to make this second semantic layer precise, three criteria are typically used
in the literature: Kreisel’s condition, i.e., taking a formula φ(x) to express the
property with extension {χ | T ` φ(pχq)}, the meaning-postulate criterion and
the resemblance criterion.4 For an overview the reader is referred to (Halbach
& Visser, 2014a), whose terminology we also adopt.
2.1 Expressing Consistency
Often attempts to give an account of expressibility of consistency, in effect
deal rather with expressibility of provability. The reason for this can be seen
to lie in the inapplicability of Kreisel’s condition, which does not range over
closed L-sentences, and the unavailability of sensible meaning-postulates. This
reduction of expressibility of consistency to expressibility of provability is typ-
ically (implicitly) justified by taking Pr(x) to express provability if and only
if ¬Pr(p0 = S0q) expresses consistency. That is to say, irrespective of which
criteria are generally thought to explicate expressibility most adequately, this
step is almost always (mostly implicitly) justified by some version of the resem-
blance criterion, which requires the structure of a formal consistency statement
to resemble the structure of a corresponding consistency statement formulated
in the metalanguage. To further clarify this, we consider various formulations
of consistency statements in a metalanguage of L:
a) the sentence ‘0 = S0’ is not T -provable;
b) for every L-sentence ψ: ψ ∧ ¬ψ is not T -provable;
c) for every L-sentence ψ: ψ or ¬ψ is not T -provable.
We now turn to formal consistency (L-)sentences:
(i) ¬PrT (p0 = S0q);
(ii) ¬PrT (pψ ∧ ¬ψq);
(iii) ¬PrT (pψq) ∨ ¬PrT (p¬ψq);
(iv) ∀x, y, z(Sent(x) ∧ Neg(x; y) ∧ Conj(x, y; z)→ ¬PrT (z));
(v) ∀x, y(Sent(x) ∧ Neg(x; y)→ (¬PrT (x) ∨ ¬PrT (y))).
3In the terminology of (Franks, 2009b).
4The fact that meaning-postulate criteria are formulated relative to a theory is compatible
with our stance on metamathematics, since “even an extensionalist might adopt an intensional
attitude when moving from the question ‘is S consistent?’ to the question ‘does S prove that
it is?’” (Franks, 2009b, p. 247).
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(i)-(iii) can be seen to have the same schematic structure as a)-c), while (iv)
and (v) are single sentences resembling the quantificational structure of b) and
c) respectively.
When employing the resemblance criterion, the appropriate choice of C de-
pends on the exact formulation of the metamathematical consistency statement
of T . For instance, taking b) as the formulation of the consistency statement, we
will take any formal sentence expressing T -consistency to be either of the form
(ii) or (iv), depending on whether a schematic or quantificational version of the
resemblance criterion is employed. The fact that this criterion is highly sensitive
to the specific formulation of the respective property in the metalanguage, ren-
ders it problematic for providing necessary conditions of expressibility. In order
to avoid unjustified restrictions, we take the construction-principles C to be any
of the above versions (i)-(v), for any sentence ψ, with PrT (x) being a predicate
satisfying PT . This ensures clause (1) of the Stability Problem to be satisfied,
since every L-formula that can reasonably be said to express T -consistency can
be taken by our liberal approach as one of the forms (i)-(v), where PrT (x) is a
predicate expressing T -provability.5 Yet, what criteria should be employed for
the expressibility of being an L-sentence, and the syntactic operations of nega-
tion and conjunction, occurring in the formulations of (iv) and (v)? Here we
resort to Kreisel’s condition as a minimal requirement, only assuming that the
formula Sent numerates (in T ) the set of (Go¨del numbers of) L-sentences, the
formula Neg numerates (in T ) the graph of the syntactic operation of negation,
etc.
2.2 Expressing Provability
It is notoriously difficult to adequately explicate the expressibility relation of
provability in a general setting and no commonly accepted standard exists in
the literature. In this paper we follow the classical approach in viewing Lo¨b’s
conditions as necessary for an L-formula to express T -provability. For instance,
Huber-Dyson (1991) takes these conditions as “the axiomatic formulation of
minimal requirements that a meaningful concept of theoremhood ought to sat-
isfy” (p. 256). Most objections to Lo¨b’s conditions pertain only to their use
as sufficient meaning postulates for theoremhood - if they are at all concerned
with meaning. Hence these often legitimate objections do not have any bearing
on this paper’s purpose, since Detlefsen’s Stability Problem is only concerned
with their less controversial use as necessary conditions. In following this clas-
sical route, we however depart from Detlefsen (1986, 2001) himself, who argues
against Lo¨b’s conditions as necessary meaning postulates for expressibility.6 We
do not attempt to resolve the contentious status of Lo¨b’s conditions in this pa-
per and leave a thorough discussion of this issue for another occasion (see also
(Franks, 2009a)). For a further philosophical assessment of Lo¨b’s conditions the
reader is referred to (Visser, 2016).
5It is difficult to provide an exhaustive list of sensible metamathematical consistency as-
sertions. However, in light of Lemma 2.1 slightly different sensible consistency statements can
be expected to yield formal L-sentences which provably imply (i) and can be therefore easily
added to our list.
6Detlefsen’s (2001) argument against a prevalent justification of the bitheoretical version
of the third derivability condition makes essential use of the fact that the representing and
the represented theory are different, as opposed to the situation present in this paper.
4
Thus according to the approach chosen in this paper, any L-formula PrT (x)
expressing T -provability is taken to satisfy Lo¨b’s conditions for T , i.e., for all
L-sentences φ and ψ:
Lo¨b1 T ` φ implies T ` PrT (pφq);
Lo¨b2 T ` PrT (pφq) ∧ PrT (pφ→ ψq)→ PrT (pψq);
Lo¨b3 T ` PrT (pφq)→ PrT (pPrT (pφq)q).
Together with C this yields the following solution to clause (1) of the Sta-
bility Problem: every L-sentence that can reasonably be said to express the
consistency of T satisfies C[PT ], viz., is of one of the forms (i)-(v), for any sen-
tence ψ, with PrT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions for T , Sent numerating (in T )
the set of (Go¨del numbers of) sentences, Neg numerating (in T ) the graph of
the negation operation, etc.
We may observe that it is sufficient to consider only consistency statements
of the form (i), when showing that every L-formula satisfying C[PT ] is not T -
provable:
Lemma 2.1. Let T ⊇ R, PrT satisfy Lo¨b1 and Lo¨b2 (for T ) and Sent, Neg
and Conj satisfy Kreisel’s condition. Let ψ be any L-sentence. Then the formal
sentences (i)-(iii) based on PrT are T -provably equivalent. Furthermore, (iv)
and (v) T -provably imply (ii) and (iii) respectively.
Thus the following classical version of Go¨del’s Second Theorem is sufficient to
establish clause (2) of the Stability Problem, i.e., to show that every L-sentence
satisfying C[PT ] is not T -provable.
Theorem 2.2 (Go¨del’s Second Theorem). Let T ⊇ R. For all L-formulæ
PrT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions (for T ), T 6` ¬PrT (p0 = S0q).
2.3 “Numbering Sensitive” Criteria
We have outlined above the classical approach for solving Detlefsen’s Stability
Problem. However, the employed conditions C[PT ] are dependent on a specific
Go¨del numbering and this strategy is thus flawed. For there might exist an L-
sentence Con∗ that can reasonably be said to express T -consistency yet only sat-
isfies the conditions C[PT ] relative to a different Go¨del numbering.7 Moreover,
Theorem 2.2 does not rule out the possibility of T ` Con∗, since its scope only
ranges over consistency statements satisfying C[PT ] relative to the specific, orig-
inally employed, numbering. This renders C[PT ] in its above version inadequate
as a necessary condition of expressing consistency. Furthermore, Theorem 2.2 is
insufficiently general to establish the T -unprovability of all sentences expressing
T -consistency. Detlefsen’s Stability Problem thus remains open, unsettling the
justification of the philosophical interpretation of Go¨del’s Second Theorem.
This problem was already observed by Heck (2007) in the context of Tarski’s
Theorem. Heck claims that:8
7Indeed this situation occurs frequently, considering the plethora of different numberings
employed in the literature.
8Let PAS be PA formulated in L∪{T}, with T being a unary predicate (whether induction
is extended to the full language does not matter here). The schematic variable A in ‘T (pAq)↔
A’ ranges over L ∪ {T}-sentences.
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it is essential [...] that his proof does not depend upon the Go¨del
numbering used. Tarski’s Theorem would be of far less interest if it
had to be stated as: for some Go¨del numberings, [...] [T (pAq)↔ A]
is inconsistent [with PAS ], although for some it is not. If that were
all Tarski had shown, then I would not wish to report him as having
shown that [‘S’ is true iff S] is inconsistent with arithmetic. (p. 27)
Here too the justification of the philosophical interpretation of this version
of Tarksi’s Theorem, viz., “the na¨ıve theory of truth, given by the scheme ‘S’
is true iff S, is inconsistent with arithmetic” (Heck, 2007, p. 27), is argued to
rely on the invariance of the corresponding formal theorem, viz., T (pAq) ↔ A
is inconsistent with PAS , with regard to numberings. For otherwise there might
exist a different numbering α such that both {T (pAqα) ↔ A | A is an L ∪
{T}-sentence} is consistent with PAS and T (x) can reasonably be said to express
na¨ıve truth (for instance, in virtue of the Tarski biconditionals T (pAqα)↔ A).
The above quote in effect contains two invariance claims. The first one
requires the proof to be independent of the employed numbering whereas the
second claim only requires the theorem itself to be independent. Prima facie,
the former claim is strictly stronger than the latter, since for instance the proof
of the Diagonal Lemma is trivial when using a numbering with “implemented
diagonalisation” (see, for instance, g of (Heck, 2007, p.22) or gn1 of (Halbach
& Visser, 2014b, Appendix)), while a standard numbering seems to require a
standard proof. Yet how may the latter invariance claim be made more precise?
It seems to be intuitively convincing that the trivial proof using g and a standard
proof of the Diagonal Lemma are different. But in more subtle cases clear
criteria are needed as to when two given proofs qualify as equal or as employing
the same methods and resources. Furthermore, there are typically various routes
to prove a theorem. For instance, one can employ a non-standard numbering
in a proof of a theorem formulated relative to a standard numbering, as is the
case in our proof of the Diagonal Lemma 4.5 (taking α to be standard).
Since in this paper we are concerned with Detlefsen’s Stability Problem, it
suffices to focus on the weaker, and more comprehensible, invariance claim. The
above analysis shows that what is needed are “numbering sensitive” versions of
the conditions C[PT ] which do not depend on the employed Go¨del numbering.9
In order to accomplish this, we first make the numbering used in the em-
ployed criteria of expressibility explicit. Prima facie, any injective function α
from a set of L-expressions to N qualifies as a numbering. A formula PrαT (x) is
then said to satisfy Lo¨b’s conditions relative to α for T , in short: satisfies PαT ,
if for all L-sentences φ and ψ:10
Lo¨b1α T ` φ implies T ` PrαT (pφqα);
Lo¨b2α T ` PrαT (pφqα) ∧ PrαT (pφ→ ψqα)→ PrαT (pψqα);
Lo¨b3α T ` PrαT (pφqα)→ PrαT (pPrαT (pφqα)qα).
9A different approach to this problem worth pursuing consists in avoiding numberings from
the beginning and to formulate Lo¨b’s conditions relative to an interpreted syntax theory, for
instance building on Feferman (1994) or Grzegorczyk (2005). This route has been recently
taken up by Fedor Pakhomov.
10Here pφqα denotes α(φ), i.e., the standard numeral of the α-code of φ.
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Similarly, the numbering is made explicit in the formalisation of consistency
statements, yielding the following principles Cα:
(i)α ¬PrαT (p0 = S0qα);
(ii)α ¬PrαT (pψ ∧ ¬ψqα);
(iii)α ¬PrαT (pψqα) ∨ ¬PrαT (p¬ψqα);
(iv)α ∀x, y, z(Sentα(x) ∧ Negα(x; y) ∧ Conjα(x, y; z)→ ¬PrαT (z));
(v)α ∀x, y(Sentα(x) ∧ Negα(x; y)→ (¬PrαT (x) ∨ ¬PrαT (y))).
The classical conditions C[PT ] can therefore be seen to be Cγ [PγT ], for some
specific standard Go¨del numbering γ. In order to accommodate the possibility of
there being two different numberings α and β, such that both ¬PrαT (p0 = S0qα)
and ¬PrβT (p0 = S0qβ) express the consistency of T , with PrαT and PrβT satisfying
PαT and PβT respectively, we extend the conditions C[PT ] by quantifying over all
possible numberings:
C∀[P∀T ] A sentence satisfies C∀[P∀T ] if it is of one of the forms (i)α-(v)α, for any
sentence ψ, with PrαT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions relative to α (for T ),
Sentα numerating (in T ) the set of α-codes of sentences, Negα numerating
(in T ) the α-codes of the graph of the negation operation, etc., for some
numbering α.
It can easily be checked that the proof of Lemma 2.1 is independent of the
employed numbering, thus once again it suffices to only consider consistency
statements of the form (i)α, when showing clause (2) of the Stability Problem.
2.4 Deviant Numberings
The above approach however allows highly artificial and deviant numberings.
For any given subset S of L-expressions an injective function α : ExpL → N can
be defined such that the set of α-codes of S is binumerable.11 For instance, set
α(φ) =
{
even if φ ∈ S,
odd otherwise.
This can simply be done by enumerating both S and ExpL \ S (without repe-
titions) and subsequently applying the number 2 · k to the k-th element of the
enumeration of S and the number 2·k+1 to the k-th element of the enumeration
of ExpL \ S. Clearly, these enumerations are possibly non-effective.
Taking S = T` then yields a numbering α such that the formula PrαT (x) ≡
∃y < x 2 · y = x satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions relative to α (for T ) and T `
¬PrαT (p0 = S0q), thus violating Go¨del’s Second Theorem. The reason for this
can be found in the failure of the Diagonal Lemma with regard to α, i.e., there
is no (α-)fixpoint of ¬PrαT (x). To see this, assume that there exists G such that
T ` ¬PrαT (pGqα) ↔ G, which implies T 6` G. But then T ` ¬PrαT (pGqα) and
therefore T ` G, yielding a contradiction.
11If no theory is specified, this should be read as “(bi-)numerable in R”.
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Similarly, setting S = Th(N) yields a numbering β such that ∃y < x 2 ·y = x
binumerates {β(φ) | N |= φ}, thus violating (the semantic version of) Tarski’s
Theorem.
While α and β appear to be highly deviant numberings disallowing any
arithmetisation of the usual syntactic properties, less artificial numberings can
be constructed for certain theories T ⊇ R which still violate Go¨del’s Second
Theorem and Tarski’s Theorem respectively.12 For instance, there exists a num-
bering δ¬ (see Appendix 6) such that despite all functions S˙, +˙, ·˙, ′˙, =˙, ∧˙, ∀˙
being recursive relative to δ¬,13 the set of T -theorems is binumerable by a ∆0-
formula Prδ
¬
(x). In particular, Prδ
¬
(x) satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions relative to δ¬,
but T ` ¬Prδ¬(p0 = S0qδ¬).
Moreover there exists a numbering δ∀ (see Appendix 6) such that despite all
functions S˙, +˙, ·˙, ′˙, =˙, ¬˙ ∧˙, →˙ being recursive relative to δ∀, the set {δ∀(φ) |
N |= φ} is binumerable by a ∆0-formula Trδ
∀
(x). In particular, the formula
Trδ
∀
(x) satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions relative to δ∀ for sound theories T ⊇ R, but
T ` ¬Trδ∀(p0 = S0qδ∀).
Both numberings δ¬ and δ∀ thus yield deviant results, even though they
allow for the arithmetisation of a large portion of syntactic properties and op-
erations. For instance, the num-function (mapping numbers to their standard
numerals) and the substitution function for terms as well as for atomic formulæ
can be binumerated relative to both numberings. However, since ¬˙ and ∀˙ are
not recursive relative to δ¬ and δ∀ respectively, the arithmetisation of the sub-
stitution function for (complex) formulæ fails for both numberings. This can
be seen as the reason why the Diagonal Lemma does not hold when employing
these numberings, since its proof crucially relies on the arithmetisation of the
substitution function.
It is important to note that these results do not serve as a refutation of
classical metamathematical theorems but rather show that our initial na¨ıve ap-
proach to numberings is not tenable. In all the above cases, sets of expressions
which are intuitively not decidable are coded by decidable arithmetical sets rel-
ative to respective deviant numberings. This stands in contrast to the intuitive
idea of numberings as mechanical procedures, translating properties of expres-
sions into arithmetical formulæ. In order to refine our na¨ıve account, we restrict
ourselves to acceptable numberings when defining numbering-sensitive criteria
of expressibility, ruling out such deviant numberings. We thus rephrase the
criterion C∀[P∀T ] as follows:
C∀∗ [P∀∗T ] A formula satisfies C∀
∗
[P∀∗T ] if it is of one of the forms (i)α-(v)α, for any
sentence ψ, with PrT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions relative to α (for T ),
Sentα numerating (in T ) the set of α-codes of sentences, Negα numerating
(in T ) the α-codes of the graph of the negation operation, etc., for some
acceptable numbering α.
12This point was raised by Albert Visser, who also suggested the initial idea underlying the
constructions of δ¬ and δ∀.
13For instance, the function ∀˙ is defined via (δ¬(x), δ¬(φ)) 7→ δ¬(∀xφ), for expressions x,
φ. The function ′˙ is defined via (δ¬(s)) 7→ δ¬(s_‘′’), for expressions s. Note that in this
framework variables are generated by subsequently concatenating primes ‘′’ to a primitive
alphabetical symbol v. See also Example 3.3. We call a function γ : A → N recursive, if A
is decidable and there exists a partial recursive function γ′ : N → N with dom(γ′) = A and
γ′A = γ. We call a function f : S1 → S2 recursive relative to 〈α1, α2〉 if α2 ◦ f ◦ α−11 is
recursive (with αi being a numbering of the set Si, i ∈ {1, 2}).
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The aim of the next section is to provide a formally precise yet conceptually
clear account of the acceptability of numberings.
3 Acceptability of Numberings
It is notoriously difficult to make the informal notion of the acceptability of
a numbering precise. However, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient
to isolate a necessary condition of acceptability. Such a condition needs to
be both conceptually convincing and formally precise. We start by reviewing
three proposals found in the literature. We then argue that they do not satisfy
our needs of generality or preciseness and conclude by proposing a satisfactory
condition for our purposes.
According to Smith (2007) “the key feature of our Go¨delian scheme [here we
denote his introduced numbering γ] is this: there is a pair of algorithms, one of
which takes us from an [L-]expression to its code number, the other of which
takes us back again from the code number to the original expression” (p. 126).
Given any other comparable coding scheme α, converting the α-code of a certain
[L-]expression φ into its γ-code involves running through two algorithms (first
mapping α(φ) to φ and then mapping φ to γ(φ)), which by assumption do not
involve any open-ended searches (Smith, 2007, p. 126). Conversely, γ-codes can
be converted into α-codes in a similar fashion. Thus “there is a p.r. function tr
which ‘translates’ code numbers according to [α] into code numbers under our
official Go¨delian scheme [γ], and another p.r. function tr−1 which converts code
numbers under our scheme back into code numbers under scheme [α]” (p. 126).14
Let us call any numbering α for which such a pair of p.r. translation functions
exist, computably translatable to γ. The following criterion of acceptability is
then due to Smith (2007):
Computable Translatability A numbering is acceptable iff it is computably
translatable to the standard numbering γ.
While we agree with Smith’s initial analysis that the key feature of accept-
ability consists essentially in intuitive computability, the proposed criterion fails
to capture this feature in a conceptually adequate way. This failure can be seen
to result from general difficulties in giving a precise account of computability
of functions whose domain and co-domain are disjoint, such as numberings. To
circumvent these difficulties, Smith instead requires acceptable numberings to
be computably translatable to some designated standard numbering γ. The
conceptual adequacy of the resulting criterion thus crucially rests on the intu-
itive computability of γ. For instance, employing one of the deviant numberings
of 2.4 as a reference numbering instead of γ, would clearly render the criterion
inadequate. What justifies the choice of γ as the reference numbering is exactly
its intuitive computability. Hence, instead of taking the conceptually prior fea-
ture of computability as characterising acceptability, a conceptual surrogate is
14The restriction to p.r. functions for tr and tr−1 is justified by construing the aforemen-
tioned algorithms without open-ended “do while” loops (see (Odifreddi, 1989, Proposition
I.5.8)). However, we believe that there is no clear reason to impose this restriction on the
algorithms, thus allowing tr and tr−1 to be recursive functions. This does however not bear
on the subsequent discussion.
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employed.15 Furthermore, Smith’s justification for the existence of p.r. trans-
lation functions between numberings which share the same “key feature” (i.e.,
come with a pair of encoding and decoding algorithms) crucially relies on infor-
mal reasoning about computability. A more satisfactory approach would be to
first formally characterise the conceptually prior notion of intuitive computabil-
ity of numberings and then mathematically prove the existence of respective
translation functions between them (cf. Theorem 3.12 and Corollary 3.14 be-
low), employing the Church-Turing-Thesis only in its “interpretive use” (Smith,
2007, p. 275).
An account of acceptability16 which is more directly linked to a characterisa-
tion of intuitive computability is introduced in (Manin, 2009) (and was already
suggested in (Montague, 1957, chapter IV)). There expressions are taken to
be finite sequences over a finite alphabet. A numbering α is called sequence-
admissible, if the image of α is decidable and the length function, the projec-
tion function given by 〈i, 〈a1, . . . , an〉〉 7→ ai and the concatenation function
are recursive.17 Taking sequence-admissibility as a characterisation of intuitive
computability (for a discussion of this claim see 3.2 below) yields the following
criterion:
Sequence-Admissibility A numbering is acceptable iff it is sequence-admissible.
This criterion improves upon computable translatability by providing a more
conceptually clear characterisation of the essential key feature of acceptability,
i.e., of intuitive computability. It has however another disadvantage, namely
its dependency on a specific representation of syntax. There are a variety of
other equally suitable representations of syntax, yet there are no convincing
arguments (known to the author) singling out a preferred or most adequate
representation. However, when employing an adequate representation different
to finite sequences, the above criterion is no longer applicable. Since this paper’s
aim is to formulate a criterion expressing T -consistency which is as “coordinate
free” as possible, causing C∀∗ [P∀∗T ] to depend on the representation of syntax
would be rather undesirable.
A third approach can be found in (Smullyan, 1961), who bases the concept of
acceptability18 of numberings on representability in elementary formal systems
(for definitions see (Smullyan, 1961, p. 6)). These systems can be seen as devices
intended to “explicate the notion of ‘definability by recursion’” (Smullyan, 1961,
p. 2) directly operating on strings, without the usual recourse to numberings.
A set E of strings which is definable by recursion in some elementary formal
system is called formally representable. If in addition to E also the complement
of E is formally representable, E is called solvable. The acceptable number-
ings of E are then taken to be exactly those which preserve these recursion
theoretic properties. More precisely, an injective function α : E → N is called
EFS-admissible, if for every subset S ⊆ E the following holds: S is formally
representable iff α(S) is r.e. and S is solvable iff α(S) is decidable. This yields:
15This argument is borrowed from (Rescorla, 2007, p. 268) who discusses the acceptability
of domain representations in the context of extending the Turing-Thesis to computational
models over other domains (see also (Shapiro, 1982)).
16The term introduced there is “admissibility”.
17More precisely, the functions are recursive relative to 〈α, id〉, 〈id×α, α〉 and 〈α × α, α〉
respectively.
18Once again, the term introduced there is “admissibility”.
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EFS-Admissibility A numbering is acceptable iff it is EFS-admissible.
Once again this definition has a computational motivation, since the concept
of formal representability is intended to capture the concept of computability, in
the sense that formally representable sets characterise sets which are generated
by a “computing machine” (Smullyan, 1961, p. 9). The above criterion can
therefore be seen as a constraint to preserve the computational content.
As in the case of sequence-admissibility, this criterion once again depends
on a specific representation of syntax. Furthermore we will show that weaker
assumptions suffice to capture the intuitive computability of a numbering.
In short, a satisfying criterion of acceptability has to account for two things:
(i) to allow for a more general approach with regard to the representation of
expressions (i.e., not presupposing expressions to be finite sequences, as in the
last two criteria) and (ii) to provide a conceptually adequate notion of com-
putability (as opposed to the computable translatability criterion). The next
two subsections are devoted to the proposal of a criterion satisfying both (i) and
(ii).
3.1 Specifications and Universes of Expressions
The aim of this subsection is to provide a formal definition of a universe of
expressions, which is general enough to accommodate a variety of different ap-
proaches to syntax representation.
Syntax is classically represented linearly, following Tarski (1936). That is,
expressions are represented as finite strings, which can be constructed by the
operation of concatenation from a finite alphabet. For instance, the conjunc-
tion of the formulæ φ and ψ can be represented as ‘(’_φ_‘ ∧ ’_ψ_‘)’. The
usual mathematical idealisation of this representation is the finite sequence
〈‘(’〉 ∗ φ ∗ 〈‘ ∧ ’〉 ∗ ψ ∗ 〈‘)’〉, where ∗ is a corresponding concatenation opera-
tion on finite sequences. The above representation employs an infix notation.
Using prefix notation however yields the different representation ‘∧(’_φ_ψ_‘)’,
postfix notation yields yet another, etc. Furthermore it can be argued that this
conjunction is more adequately represented by the finite tree
‘ ∧ ’
φ ψ
which exhibits the inductive structure of the resulting expression more clearly
and which is not dependent on arbitrary notational choices as in the linear
case. Alternatively, expressions are represented as nested pairs (also called S-
expressions) in (Feferman, 1994) or as hereditarily finite sets in (Fitting, 2007).
Moving further towards an abstract syntax approach, Be´ziau (1999) construes a
universe of expressions as an absolutely free algebra (see also (Halbach & Visser,
2014b, p. 711)).19 An in-depth discussion of the arbitrary choices involved in
the treatment of syntax can be found in (Visser, 2016).
The specific representation of syntax is classically taken to have no bear-
ing on the treatment of Go¨del’s Second Theorem, with few exceptions such as
19Be´ziau (1999) is only concerned with propositional expressions, however the scope of his
arguments can also be extended to first-order expressions.
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Visser (2016), who accurately observes that “no mathematical treatment of G2
correctly reflects our intuitive insight that is independent of the long sequence of
design choices usually associated with the formulation of G2” (p. 81).20 What is
more, a sensible notion of computability of numberings, as in the case of the cri-
terion of sequence-admissibility, explicitly resorts to the structure of expressions
which in turn crucially depends on the choice of representation. Since the aim of
this paper is to eliminate such arbitrary choices in the formulation of C∀∗ [P∀∗T ],
we introduce a framework which accommodates a general class of representa-
tions, including all those mentioned above, allowing for a uniform treatment
of computability. The only restriction consists in assuming expressions to be
generated from a finite “protoalphabet”, following Quine (1940).
In what follows, we take expressions to be specified by both a signature and
an axiomatic theory formulated in equational logic. Each respective signature
consists of specified function symbols which may be thought of as constructors,
generating “raw expressions” from the alphabet, which is a designated subset
of the signature containing constant symbols (also called generators). Thus,
in mathematical terms, the signature induces a term algebra. The equational
theory, which serves as the other constituent of a specification, provides con-
straints, specifying which raw expressions of the term algebra are to be iden-
tified. For instance, endowing the term algebra with a semi-group structure
yields a representation of expressions as finite sequences (up to isomorphism).
In order to meet our requirement of generality, expressions are taken to be spec-
ified independently of any choice of concrete implementations. Consequently, a
specification of expressions gives rise to various representations of expressions
which can be thought of as different ways of implementing a given specification.
We will see that equational logic and initial algebra semantics, developed by
Goguen et al. (1977), provide a suitable framework to make this precise. Since
this framework is perhaps not widely known, we will take some time introducing
it.
Let Ω be an algebraic signature, i.e., a finite set of function symbols with
given finite arities. Furthermore, let Ωn denote the subset of Ω which contains all
function symbols of arity n. Each Ω is partitioned into a set Ω+ of constructors
and a set Ω0 of generators, which only contains function symbols of arity 0. The
set Ω0 is also called an alphabet.
Definition 3.1. Let X be a set and let Ω be an algebraic signature. The set
TΩ(X) of terms of signature Ω over X is the smallest set such that
1. X ∪ Ω0 ⊆ TΩ(X);
2. If t1, . . . , tn ∈ TΩ(X) and σ ∈ Ωn, then σ(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TΩ(X).21
We can naturally transform the set TΩ(X) into an Ω-algebra, called the term
algebra TΩ(X) over X. When the context is determining Ω, we sometimes also
write T (X) and T(X) respectively.
20Furthermore, it is observed in (Halbach & Visser, 2014a, p. 677) that the resemblance
criterion is also sensitive to the representation of syntax.
21Here and in what follows, σ(t1, . . . , tn) denotes the formal expression
σ_‘(’_t1
_ . . . _tn
_‘)’.
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A short overview of equational logic is given below as its syntax is used
for specifications, while its semantics provide concrete representations of spec-
ifications. Proofs and further material can be found in the classic (Burris &
Sankappanavar, 1981).
Semantics. Let Ω be a signature and X a set of variables such that Ω∩X = ∅.
An Ω-equation over X is an expression of the form s ≈ t, with s, t ∈ TΩ(X). An
Ω-algebra A is said to satisfy an equation s ≈ t over X, in symbols A |=Ω s ≈ t,
if α(s) = α(t) for every homomorphism α : TΩ(X) → A. The variables in an
equation are therefore implicitly taken to be universally quantified. For a set of
Ω-equations E we write A |=Ω E , if A |=Ω e for every e ∈ E . We then also call
A a model of E . For a class C of Ω-algebras we write C |=Ω s ≈ t, if s ≈ t is
satisfied by each member of C. In particular, Mod(Ω, E) denotes the class of all
Ω-algebras satisfying a set of equations E .
Sytnax. The formulæ of equational logic consist of all Ω-equations over a set
X of variables. From a set E of Ω-equations, new Ω-equations can be deduced via
the inference rules s ≈ s , s ≈ tt ≈ s ,
s ≈ t t ≈ u
s ≈ u ,
s ≈ t
α(s) ≈ α(t) and
s1 ≈ t1 . . . sn ≈ tn
σ(s1, . . . , sn) ≈ σ(t1, . . . , tn) for any σ ∈ Ωn, s, t, u, s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tn ∈
TΩ(X) and homomorphisms α on TΩ(X) (i.e., substitutions). We write E `Ω e,
if e is an Ω-equation derived by the above rules with equations in E as axioms.
It was first shown by Birkhoff (1935) that equational logic is sound and
complete, i.e., for every Ω-equation e, Mod(Ω, E) |=Ω e iff E `Ω e.
Thus far, expressions are specified by a signature and an axiomatic equa-
tional theory. However, when considering numberings, we need domains to
assign natural numbers to. Thus a transition from a given specification (Ω, E)
to structures with domains is called for, without changing the information car-
ried by (Ω, E). Consequently, certain models of the theory E are singled out as
intended. To do so, firstly, we confine ourselves to models of E which do not
satisfy more equalities than provable from E . Secondly, we stipulate that an
intended model does not contain more elements than necessary, i.e., elements
which do not denote closed Ω-terms.
Definition 3.2. An Ω-algebra A is called an intended model of (Ω, E), if
1. A |=Ω e iff E `Ω e for every Ω-equation e;
2. all elements of A denote closed terms of Ω. Equivalently, the (unique)
Ω-homomorphism TΩ → A is surjective.
Let (Ω, E) be a specification. We call any intended model E of (Ω, E) a universe
of expressions. If E contains all L-terms and L-formulæ, we call E a universe
of arithmetical expressions.
This definition provides a very general notion, accommodating most repre-
sentations used in the literature:
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Example 3.3.
I) Finite Sequences. Let Ω+ = {‘_’} and Ω0 = {‘v’, ‘′’, ‘0’, ‘S’, ‘ + ’, ‘ · ’, ‘ =
’, ‘¬’, ‘ ∧ ’, . . .}. Let A∗ be the set of all finite sequences of elements of
the alphabet A = Ω0 (without the empty sequence) and let ∗ be the
concatenation operator on A∗, turning (A∗, ∗) into an Ω+-semi-group.
Let furthermore E = {_(_(x, y), z) ≈ _(x,_(y, z))}. Then (A∗, ∗) is a
universe of arithmetical expressions, since (A∗, ∗) ∼= TΩ+(A)/ ∼E . Note
that in this framework the n-th variable is represented by the sequence
starting with ‘v’, followed by n subscripts ‘′’.
II) Finite Sequences with Empty Sequence. Let A be as above and let
Ω+ = {‘_’, ‘ u ’}, where ‘ u ’ is a constant symbol. Let now A∗ be
the set of all finite sequences of elements of A including the empty se-
quence 1, turning (A∗, ∗, 1) into an Ω+-monoid. Let E = {_(_(x, y), z) ≈
_(x,_(y, z)), _(x,u) ≈ x,_(u, x) ≈ x}. Then (A∗, ∗, 1) ∼= TΩ+(A)/ ∼E
and therefore (A∗, ∗, 1) is a universe of arithmetical expressions.
III) Finite Trees. Let Ω+ = {‘S’, ‘ + ’, ‘ · ’, ‘ = ’, ‘¬’, ‘ ∧ ’, ‘′’, . . .} and Ω0 =
{‘v’, ‘0’}. The set of finite trees with elements of Ω0 as leaves and elements
of Ω+ as other vertices (with respective arity) is Ω-isomorphic to TΩ and
is thus a universe of arithmetical expressions.22
IV) Finite Sets. Let Ω+ = {‘U’, ‘S’, ‘∅’} (with ‘U’ a binary and ‘S’ a unary
function symbol and ‘∅’ a constant symbol) and Ω0 = {‘v’, ‘′’, ‘0’, ‘S’, ‘+’, ‘·
’, ‘¬’, ‘ ∧ ’, . . .}. Let E = {U(x, y) ≈ U(y, x),U(x,∅) ≈ x,U(U(x, y), z) ≈
U(x,U(y, z)),U(x, x) ≈ x} be the equational theory of a bounded join-
semilattice. Let HF denote the structure of hereditarily finite sets with
UHF(x, y) = x ∪ y, SHF(x) = {x}, ∅HF = ∅ and sHF = {s} for each s ∈ Ω0
(the elements of Ω0 are taken as Urelements). Then HF is a universe of
arithmetical expression of (Ω, E), since HF ∼= TΩ+(Ω0)/ ∼E .
V) S-Expressions. Let Ω+ = {‘P ’} and Ω0 = {‘v’, ‘′’, ‘0’, ‘S’, ‘ + ’, ‘ · ’, ‘¬’, ‘ ∧
’, . . .}. TΩ is the structure of S-expressions with Ω0 as a set of Urelements
and a universe of arithmetical expressions. Originally, these expressions
were invented for the programming language LISP. However, this approach
can also be found in (Feferman, 1994).
In order to show that the above representations are indeed universes of ex-
pressions, we have used an important characterisation of the intended models
of a given specification (Ω, E):23
Lemma 3.4. Let E be an Ω-algebra and ν : Ω0 → E, s 7→ sE. Assume that
no element of Ω0 occurs in equations of E. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
1. E is initial in Mod(Ω, E);
2. EΩ+ has the (ν-)generalised universal property for Mod(Ω+, E) over Ω0;
22It may be desirable to distinguish a sort for terms from a sort for formulæ. A survey of a
many-sorted initial algebra approach can be found in (Goguen et al., 1977, section 2).
23See, for instance, Burris & Sankappanavar (1981).
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3. E is an intended model of the specification (Ω, E).
Definition 3.5. Let C be a class of Ω-algebras and let A ∈ C. Let ν : X → A
be such that A is generated by ν(X). If for every B ∈ C and for every function
α : X → B there is a unique homomorphism α∗ : A→ B such that α∗ ◦ ν = α,
then we say that A has the (ν-)generalised universal property for C over X. If
X ⊆ A and ν is the inclusion function we also say that A has the universal
property for C over X. If A has the universal property for C over ∅ we call A
initial in C.
Define now a relation ∼E on TΩ(X) by setting s ∼E t iff E `Ω s ≈ t. It is
easy to see that s ∼E t is a congruence on TΩ(X) and the resulting Ω-algebra
TΩ(X)/ ∼E satisfies E . An important property of this algebra is that it has
the (ν-)generalised universal property for Mod(Ω, E) over X, where ν : X →
{[x]∼E | x ∈ X} is the natural map x 7→ [x]∼E . In particular, TΩ/ ∼E is initial
in Mod(Ω, E). Furthermore, algebras with the universal properties over sets
with the same cardinality are unique up to isomorphism. It thus follows from
Lemma 3.4 that an Ω-algebra E is an intended model of (Ω, E) iff EΩ+ ∼=Ω+
TΩ+(Ω
0)/ ∼E , granted that no element of Ω0 occurs in equations of E .
3.2 Computable Simulations of Expressions
Based on this general account of representations we introduce now a precise
notion of computable simulation of universes of expressions E. We then try to
argue that the computable simulation of E are precisely the intuitively com-
putable numberings of E, given the intuitive computability of E. Thus, as we
argue, the introduced criterion both satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) (see page 11),
which were required for a satisfactory account of acceptability.
Let E be a fixed universe of arithmetical expressions, with specification
(Ω, E). Let α : E → N be any injective function and set G = α(E). We de-
fine σG : G
k → G by setting σG(n1, . . . , nk) = α(σE(α−1(n1), . . . , α−1(nk))) for
each σ ∈ Ω+k , i.e., the diagram
Ek E
Gk G
σE
αk α
σG
commutes (with αk(n) = (α(n1), . . . , α(nk))). Each σG can be seen as simulat-
ing the corresponding operation on E and is also called the tracking function of
σE under α. Then G together with the tracking functions σG is an Ω
+-algebra
G of Go¨del numbers. Furthermore, α : E→ G is an Ω+-isomorphism and G is
Ω+-generated over {α(sE) | s ∈ Ω0}.
Hence, to each constructor operation σE on E there corresponds a tracking
constructor operation σG on G such that the set of Go¨del numbers G is gener-
ated from these constructors over the set of α-codes of generators of E. Thus
G can be seen as a simulation of E via α.
Until now no constraints were imposed on the given numbering α. That
α computably simulates E can now be expressed as the constraint that the
tracking constructor operations σG mechanically generate the simulating set
of Go¨del numbers. Since these constructors operate on natural numbers, their
15
computability can be explicated via the Church-Turing-Thesis. Additionally,
we require that there exists a mechanical procedure checking whether or not a
given input is the α-code of an expression. This yields the following definition:24
Definition 3.6. Let E be a universe of expressions. We call a numbering
α : E → N a computable simulation of E (or computably simulating E), if
1. α(E) is decidable;
2. for each σ ∈ Ω+k there exists a recursive tracking function σN : α(E)k →
α(E) of σE, i.e., σN(α(t1), . . . , α(tk)) = α(σE(t1, . . . , tk)), for all t1, . . . , tk ∈
E.
We can now give a precise formulation of our proposed criterion:
Computable Simulativity Every acceptable numbering of a universe of ex-
pressions is a computable simulation thereof.
We now turn to the question of its conceptual adequacy. Since this involves
speaking more carefully about computability, it is useful to have a general notion
of a computational model at hand. The following definitions are taken from
(Boker & Dershowitz, 2008), with slight modifications.25
Definition 3.7. A computational model C over domain EC is any object asso-
ciated with a set of functions f : EC → EC. This set of functions is called the
extensionality of the computational model (also denoted by C, slightly abusing
the notation).
In order to state a version of the Church-Turing-Thesis for computational
models over a wide class of domains, a relation of comparing the power of such
models is introduced.26 The basic idea is, that a model D is at least as powerful
as a model C, if all functions of C can be bijectively27 represented in D:
Definition 3.8. Let C and D be computational models over EC and ED respec-
tively. We call D (computationally) at least as powerful as C, denoted C v D,
if there is a bijective function ρ : EC → ED such that {ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ−1 | f ∈ C} ⊆ D.
We call C and D (computationally) equivalent if C v D v C.
Let REC denote the set of the general recursive functions and let TM denote
the set of total functions which are Turing-computable. By a classical result,
REC and TM are computationally equivalent (see, for instance, (Jones, 1997,
chapter 8)).
Based on the relation v, a precise version of the Church-Turing-Thesis over
arbitrary domains can be stated (see (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008, p. 208)):
24This definition is used in (Stoltenberg-Hansen & Tucker, 1995) to characterise the notion
of a computable algebra.
25Since numberings are total functions, we restrict the extensionality of computational mod-
els to total functions.
26For a motivation of this approach and an in-depth discussion of other routes to expli-
cate the notion of computability over arbitrary domains, the reader is referred to Boker &
Dershowitz (2008) and Rescorla (2007) respectively.
27This is technically convenient but might appear as a rather ad-hoc restriction. However,
for C v REC to hold it is sufficient that there exists an injective function pi : EC → N such
that {pi ◦ f ◦ pi−1 | f ∈ C} ⊆ REC and impi is r.e. (i.e., C is representationally at least as
powerful as REC in the terminology of (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008)). Since impi is r.e., there
exists a recursive bijection τ : impi → N such that also τ−1 is recursive. Taking ρ = τ ◦ pi
yields a bijection such that {ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ−1 | f ∈ C} ⊆ REC, thus C v REC.
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Church-Turing-Thesis C v TM, for every intuitively computable model C.
As is shown in (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008), the adequacy of the Church-
Turing-Thesis in the above version relies on a certain robustness with regard to
representations of the reference model.
Definition 3.9. A model is complete if it is not of equivalent power to any of
its strict supermodels. That is, C is complete if C ⊆ D v C implies C = D, for
all models D.
Not every computational model is complete, however REC and TM are, see
(Boker & Dershowitz, 2006, section 4).
However, we still lack a precise account of intuitive computability of func-
tions with different domains. Here, we characterise the intuitive computability
of such functions by preservation of computability. More precisely, let C and
D be equivalent computational models over EC and ED respectively. We take
a function α : EC → ED to be intuitively computable (based on the intuitive
computability of C and D) iff the following condition is satisfied:
(C)C,D For every f : EC → EC, f ∈ C iff the tracking function of f under α is
in D.
The direction from left to right of (C)C,D is motivated by the intuition that
since D is at least as powerful as C, computability ought to be preserved by
α, i.e., every C-computable function is mapped to a D-computable function.
The other direction ensures that, since C being at least as powerful as D, only
C-computable functions are mapped to D-computable functions.
Let now E be a universe of expressions. If E is intuitively computable, its
constructors are intuitively computable, thus there is a computational model
C over E which is intuitively computable such that σE ∈ C for all σ ∈ Ω+.
We furthermore assume that C is at least as powerful as TM. By the classi-
cal version of the Church-Turing-Thesis, REC provides an intuitively adequate
computational model over N. The following theorem, which is a slight generali-
sation of Theorem 2 in (Boker & Dershowitz, 2008), shows that in this case the
intuitively computable numberings of E with decidable image are exactly the
computable simulations of E, assuming the intuitive adequacy of C.
Theorem 3.10. Let E be a universe of expressions and let C be a computational
model over E which is intuitively computable, with σE ∈ C for all σ ∈ Ω+. Then
every numbering α : E → N with decidable image satisfies condition (C)C,REC iff
it is a computable simulation of E.
Proof. Let α : E → N be a computable simulation. Since by assumption TM v
C, the Church-Turing-Thesis yields the equivalence of C and TM. Since also
TM and REC are equivalent and v is a preorder, the equivalence of C and REC
obtains. Since in addition REC is complete, there exists a bijection ρ : E → N
such that {ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ−1 | f ∈ C} = REC (this can be shown along the lines
of the proof of Theorem 4.2 in (Boker & Dershowitz, 2006)). In particular,
ρ ◦ σE ◦ ρ−1 ∈ REC for all σ ∈ Ω+, hence also ρ is a computable simulation
of E. Thus α ◦ ρ−1, ρ ◦ α−1 ∈ REC by Theorem 3.12. We show now that
(C)C,REC holds. If f ∈ C, then there exists g ∈ REC such that f = ρ−1 ◦ g ◦ ρ.
Since α ◦ f ◦ α−1 = α ◦ ρ−1 ◦ g ◦ ρ ◦ α−1 and REC is closed under composition,
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g ∈ REC obtains. Let now f : E → E be such that its tracking function h under
α is recursive. Define g = ρ ◦ α−1 ◦ h ◦ α ◦ ρ−1. Clearly, g ∈ REC and thus
ρ−1 ◦g◦ρ ∈ C. Since h tracks f under α we get f = α−1 ◦h◦α = ρ−1 ◦g◦ρ ∈ C.
Let now α be a numbering with decidable image which is not a computable
simulation. Then there is a constructor σE ∈ C of E such that its tracking
function is not recursive, violating condition (C)C,REC.
3.3 Equivalence of Numberings
In this subsection we introduce an equivalence relation on numberings. We
then use the fact that all acceptable numberings are equivalent to show that
computable simulativity is extensionally equivalent to the criteria of computable
translatability, sequence-admissibility and EFS-admissibility.
Definition 3.11 (Manin (2009)). Let S be a set. We call two numberings α, β
of S equivalent (and write α ∼ β), if α◦β−1 : β(S)→ N and β ◦α−1 : α(S)→ N
are recursive.
It can be easily checked that ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Theorem 3.12 (Mal’cev (1961)). Let E be a universe of expressions and let α
and β be computable simulations of E. Then α ∼ β.
Proof. Let (Ω, E) be a specification such that E ∼= TΩ/ ∼E . Since TΩ is mini-
mal, also the factor algebra TΩ/ ∼E is. Thus also E is minimal and in particular
finitely generated. The proof then proceeds as in (Stoltenberg-Hansen & Tucker,
1995).
A subset R ⊆ S is called decidable, recursively enumerable, arithmetical
relative to a numbering α, if the set α(R) has the respective property. The
following lemma shows that these properties are invariant with regard to ac-
ceptable numberings.28
Lemma 3.13. Let Si be sets and let αi and βi be numberings of Si such that
αi ∼ βi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k ∈ N. Then for any subset R ⊆ S1 × . . . × Sk
the set α1 × . . . × αk(R) is decidable, recursively enumerable, arithmetical iff
β1 × . . .× βk(R) has the respective property.
From Theorem 3.12 and Lemma 3.13 we obtain the extensional equivalence
of computable simulativity and computable translatability:
Corollary 3.14. A numbering α of a universe of expressions is a computable
simulation iff it is computably translatable to the standard numbering γ.
Moreover, computable simulativity is extensionally equivalent both to sequence-
admissibility and EFS-admissibility, if expressions are represented as finite se-
quences:
Corollary 3.15. Let E be as in Example 3.3.I and let α be a numbering of E.
The following are equivalent:
1. α is a computable simulation of E;
28This is in principle Lemma VII.1.5 in (Manin, 2009).
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2. α is is sequence-admissible;
3. α is is EFS-admissible;
Proof. (2⇒ 1) and (3⇒ 1) are immediate.
(1 ⇒ 2): Let γ be a standard numbering which is a computable simulation
as well as sequence-admissible. Then the length function and the concatena-
tion function is recursive relative to 〈γ, id〉 and 〈id×γ, γ〉 respectively (see foot-
note 17 on page 10). For any computable simulation α of E, these functions
are also recursive relative to 〈α, id〉 and 〈id×α, α〉 respectively, since α ∼ γ
(Theorem 3.12) and r.e. sets are invariant with regard to equivalent numberings
by Lemma 3.13.
(1⇒ 3): Use Theorem 3.12 and Lemma 3.13.
Computable simulativity therefore provides a conceptually adequate crite-
rion which is strong enough to extensionally coincide with the three criteria
introduced above. However, as opposed to Smith (2007), Manin (2009) and
Smullyan (1961) we impose computable simulativity only as a necessary condi-
tion for acceptability.29
3.4 Other Routes to Acceptability
We conclude this section with a discussion of criteria which are motivated by
semantic considerations rather than computational ones. Since numberings play
a crucial role in endowing arithmetical expressions with a second layer of mean-
ing, in addition to their standard interpretation over N, it is reasonable to base
the acceptability of numberings on some principle of compositionality. Accord-
ingly, the meaning of every complex expression can be taken to be determined
by its structure and the meanings of its subexpressions.30 To make this more
precise, we call s ∈ E an immediate subexpression of t ∈ E, if there exists
σ ∈ Ωk such that t = σE(t1 . . . , tk) and s = ti for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We
then take the subexpression relation to be the non-reflexive transitive closure
of the immediate subexpression relation. The compositionality of α, i.e., the
claim that every complex expression of E is determined by its structure and the
(α-)meanings of its subexpressions can then be understood as α : E→ G being
an Ω+-homomorphism.31 But as we have already seen above, every numbering
α induces such a homomorphism. Hence every numbering is compositional in
this sense.
Taking compositionality as a constituent for the acceptability of numberings,
it can be shown that even the “mode of presentation” does not yield any proper
restriction on numberings. Let α : E → N be any numbering and set G = α(E).
Let ν : Ω0 → E be the map s 7→ sE. As we have seen above, α : E → G
is an Ω+-isomorphism, hence G ∈ Mod(Ω+, E). The numbering α can then
be reconstructed in the following standard “bottom-up” fashion: firstly, map
each element s of the alphabet Ω0 to the number α ◦ ν(s). Secondly, assign
29Smith’s (2007) treatment does not require sufficient conditions and he imposes accept-
ability only as a necessary condition for being “intuitively ‘sensible’” (p. 126).
30The following discussion does not depend on the specific conception of meaning of expres-
sions. One might even endorse a similar principle of compositionality which resorts merely to
the reference of expressions.
31As in 3.2, G is the Ω+-algebra of Go¨del numbers with domain G = α(E).
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to each constructor σ ∈ Ω+k the partial function σG : Nk → N. These two
steps then uniquely determine our initially given numbering, since by the ν-
generalised universal property of EΩ+, α is the unique function which extents
the assignment given in step 1 and is compositional with regard to the partial
functions given in step 2, i.e., is an Ω+-homomorphism.
Thus every numbering irrespective of its presentation can be reconstructed
in the above fashion, which is the prevalent mode of presentation for standard
Go¨del numbers found in the literature.
Furthermore, it is ubiquitous in the literature to employ monotone construc-
tors σG in step 2. This gives rise to the following property of Go¨del numberings:
Definition 3.16. A numbering α of E is called monotone, if for every s, t ∈ E
α(s) < α(t) iff s is a subexpression of t.
Monotonicity is a prevalent property shared by all standard numberings
found in the literature (which are known to the author), yet seems justified
more by technical convenience than conceptual analysis. For instance, requiring
monotonicity ensures that the above bottom-up mode of presentation yields
an injective function and therefore a numbering. Monotonicity thus serves as a
technical constraint warranting the intended output of a particular construction
principle. More importantly, to require monotonicity ensures a low arithmetical
complexity of formulæ representing syntactic properties, providing a crucial
advantage in proving metamathematical theorems.
But are there any conceptual reasons justifying this property as a crite-
rion for acceptability of numberings, which are not merely based on technical
considerations? To begin with, the subexpression relation can be taken as an
important structural relation of a universe of expressions E. Moreover, it can
be argued that an acceptable numbering should preserve the structure of E.
On these grounds, the induced algebra of Go¨del numbers can be required to
simulate the subexpression relation appropriately. Technically, this amounts to
extending the signature Ω by a relation symbol ‘≺’ and construing E as an
Ω ∪ {‘≺’}-algebra, where ≺E is the subexpression-relation on E. A numbering
α of E may then be called structure preserving if α : E → G can be turned
into an Ω ∪ {‘≺’}-isomorphism. It can be easily seen that in a similar way as
in 3.2, for every α a “tracking relation” ≺G on G can be defined, such that G
is an Ω ∪ {‘≺’}-algebra and α is an Ω ∪ {‘≺’}-isomorphism. Thus, once again,
structure preservation in this sense does not impose any proper restriction on
numberings.32
In requiring monotonicity, one has to additionally refer to the arithmetical
content of ≺G, namely to require ≺G to be the arithmetical order relation <.
Yet how to conceptually justify this? It seems that by demanding monotonicity,
one no longer conceives of numberings as mere means to translate expressions
into numbers in a structure preserving way, but moreover, one requires prop-
erties of expressions to be “resembled” in the arithmetical content of G. In
32Analogously, Definition 3.6 could be extended by also requiring the computability of the
“tracking relation” ≺G as another necessary condition of acceptability. Yet, in a similar way
as in the proof of Corollary 3.15 we can show that for every computable simulation α also
the “tracking relation” ≺G under α is recursive. This additional condition therefore does not
pose a proper constraint to computable simulativity.
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a similar vein, one may require that 0G = 0 (i.e., the Go¨del number of the
constant symbol ‘0’ is 0).
It remains unsettled how this form of “content resemblance” can be based
on conceptually adequate grounds. In our view, such a requirement seems to
confuse the two layers of meaning assigned to expressions. While one layer en-
dows arithmetical expressions with their standard arithmetical interpretation,
the other allows the simulation of syntax in arithmetic. Since syntax is taken
here to be conceptually different from natural numbers, there are no convinc-
ing reasons why the meaning, qua syntax simulation, of an expression (i.e., its
Go¨del number) should depend on the standard interpretation of that expres-
sion. We therefore treat these two semantic layers independently and construe
numberings merely as syntactic translational devices, blind of the arithmetical
content of the translated expressions. Consequently in what follows, accept-
able numberings are not required to be monotone. This also permits a more
general approach, since monotonicity constitutes a proper constraint on com-
putable simulations. For an example of a non-monotone computable simulation
see (Halbach & Visser, 2014b, Appendix).
4 Invariance of Go¨del’s Second Theorem
We start this section by proving the invariance of the semantic version of Tarski’s
Theorem, which is a slight generalisation of the result in (Manin, 2009, p. 240):33
Theorem 4.1. For all acceptable numberings α of a universe of arithmetical
expressions, the set {α(φ) | N |= φ} is not arithmetical.
Proof. Let α be any acceptable numbering of a universe of arithmetical expres-
sions and let γ be a standard numbering such that Tarski’s Theorem holds with
regard to γ, i.e., {γ(φ) | N |= φ} is not arithmetical. By Lemma 3.13 also
{α(φ) | N |= φ} is not arithmetical.
In order to establish the invariance of Go¨del’s Second Theorem, we formalise
certain properties of the equivalence of numberings in R.
Definition 4.2. Let γ : A→ N be a function withA ⊆ N and let f(x, y) ∈ FmlL
be a binumeration of (the graph of) γ. We call f(x, y) an inj-binumeration of
γ if R ` ∀x, y(f(x,m) ∧ f(y,m)→ x = y), for all m ∈ γ(A).
Lemma 4.3. Let A ⊆ N. For each injective recursive function γ : A→ N there
exists an inj-binumeration thereof.
Proof. Let γ : A → N be an injective recursive function and let γ′ be a to-
tal recursive function extending γ. By Theorem II.6 of (Tarski et al., 1953)
there is a binumeration g(x, y) of γ′. Let α(x) be a binumeration of A. Then
33In order to prove Theorem 4.1 it is sufficient to require “arithmetical simulativity” as a
necessary condition for acceptabiliy. To make this precise, Definition 3.6 can be weakened by
requiring α(E) and the tracking functions of the constructors only to be arithmetical. Then a
version of Theorem 3.12 can be proven, showing that all arithmetical simulations are “arith-
metically equivalent”, i.e., the translations of two arithmetical simulations are arithmetical
(see Definition 3.11). Finally a version of Lemma 3.13 can be proven, showing that arith-
metical sets are preserved by arithmetically equivalent numberings. (Smullyan, 1992, p. 23)
contains a similar observation.
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f ′(x, y) ≡ α(x)∧ g(x, y) is a binumeration of γ. Define f(x, y) ≡ f ′(x, y)∧∀z ≤
x(f ′(z, y)→ x = z).
In order to show that f(x, y) numerates γ, let n,m ∈ N be such that γ(n) =
m. Since f ′(x, y) binumerates γ, we have R ` f ′(n,m) and R ` ¬f ′(k,m) for all
k < n. Thus R ` f ′(k,m) → n = k for all k < n, which yields R ` f ′(k,m) →
n = k for all k ≤ n. Using R4 yields (∗) R ` ∀z ≤ n(f ′(z,m) → n = z). Thus
R ` f(n,m). Since R ` ¬f ′(n,m) → ¬f(n,m) and R is consistent, f(x, y) also
binumerates γ.
Let m ∈ γ(A). Let n ∈ N be such that (∗∗) R ` f(n,m). In order to show
that f(x, y) is an inj-binumeration it suffices to show that R ` ∀x f(x,m) →
x = n, which we prove in the following derivation in R:
(1) f ′(n,m) (∗∗)
(2) f(x,m)→ f ′(x,m) ∧ ∀z ≤ x(f ′(z,m)→ x = z) Definition of f(x, y)
(3) n ≤ x ∨ x ≤ n R5
(4) n ≤ x ∧ ∀z ≤ x(f ′(z,m)→ x = z)→ x = n (1) and f.o. logic
(5) x ≤ n ∧ f ′(x,m) ∧ ∀z ≤ n(f ′(z,m)→ n = z)→ x = n f.o. logic
(6) ∀z ≤ n(f ′(z,m)→ n = z) (∗)
(7) f ′(x,m) ∧ ∀z ≤ x(f ′(z,m)→ x = z)→ x = n (3)-(6)
(8) ∀x f(x,m)→ x = n (2),(7) and f.o.logic
Lemma 4.4. Let A ⊆ N and γ : A→ N be an injective recursive function. Let
f(x, y) be an inj-binumeration of γ and let φ(x) ∈ FmlL. Then there exists
ψ(y) ∈ FmlL such that R ` f(n,m) → (φ(n) ↔ ψ(m)), for all n ∈ N and
m ∈ γ(A).
Furthermore, if φ(x) is a Σ01-numeration of G ⊆ A, then ψ(y) numerates
γ(G).
Proof. Define ψ(y) ≡ ∃z (f(z, y) ∧ φ(z)). Using the fact that f(x, y) is an inj-
binumeration of γ, it is straightforward to show that R ` f(n,m) → (φ(n) ↔
ψ(m)).
Let now φ(x) be a Σ01-numeration of G ⊆ A. Let m ∈ N be such that
R ` ψ(m), i.e., R ` ∃z (f(z,m) ∧ φ(z)) by definition of ψ. Then there exists
n ∈ N such that N |= f(n,m) ∧ φ(n) (by the soundness of R). Since f(x, y)
is a binumeration of γ it also defines34 γ, hence γ(n) = m. Since φ is a Σ01-
numeration of G we get n ∈ G by Σ01-completeness. Thus m = γ(n) ∈ γ(G)
obtains. The proof of the other direction is immediate.
In addition to proving the invariance of Go¨del’s Second Theorem, the above
method can also be used to simplify proofs of metamathematical theorems.
For instance, they provide a proof of the Diagonal Lemma which avoids the
usual tedious process of arithmetisation (in particular of the numeral and the
substitution functions).
Lemma 4.5. Let T ⊇ R and let α be an acceptable numbering and φ(x) ∈ Fml1L.
Then there exists a sentence γ such that T ` φ(pγqα)↔ γ.
34We say that φ(x) ∈ FmlL defines a set A ⊆ Nn if N |= φ(k)⇔ k ∈ A, for all k ∈ Nn.
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Proof. Let gn1 be the numbering introduced in (Halbach & Visser, 2014b, Ap-
pendix). It can be easily checked that gn1 is a computable simulation. Thus
α ∼ gn1 by Theorem 3.12. By Lemma 4.4 there exists a formula ψ(y) such that
for all n ∈ N and m ∈ (gn1◦α−1)(N) we have (∗) R ` f(n,m)→ (φ(n)↔ ψ(m)),
where f binumerates gn1 ◦α−1. By definition of gn1, for any given formula ψ(y)
there exists k ∈ N such that gn1(ψ(k)) = k (see Lemma 12.3 in (Halbach &
Visser, 2014b)). Hence pψ(k)qgn1 ≡ k and therefore ` ψ(pψ(k)qgn1) ↔ ψ(k).
Setting γ ≡ ψ(k), (∗) yields R ` φ(pγqα) ↔ ψ(pγqgn1). Thus R ` φ(pγqα) ↔
γ.
Note that neither the definition of gn1 nor the proofs of Theorem 3.12 and
Lemma 4.4 employ any arithmetisation of the usual syntactic properties and
operations.
Corollary 4.6 (Syntactic version of Tarski’s Theorem). Let T ⊇ R and let α
be an acceptable numbering. Then there exists no formula τ(x) ∈ Fml1L such
that T ` γ ↔ τ(pγqα) for every L-sentence γ.
Lemma 4.7. Let α and β be equivalent numberings of E and let T ⊇ R. Then
there exists a binumeration f(x, y) of β ◦α−1 such that for each Prα(x) ∈ FmlL
satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions relative to α (for T ) there exists Prβ(x) ∈ FmlL
satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions relative to β (for T ), such that R ` f(n,m) →
(Prα(n)↔ Prβ(m)), for all n ∈ N and m ∈ β(E).
Furthermore, if Prα(x) is a Σ01-numeration of α(T
`), then Prβ(x) numerates
β(T`).
Proof. By Lemma 4.3 & 4.4 there exists a binumeration f(x, y) of β ◦α−1 and a
formula Prβ(x) such that (∗) R ` f(n,m) → (Prα(n) ↔ Prβ(m)), for all n ∈ N
and m ∈ β(E). We show now that Prβ(x) satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions relative to
β for T :
(i) If T ` φ, then T ` Prα(pφqα), since Prα(x) satisfies Lo¨b1α. We have R `
f(pφqα, pφqβ), since f(x, y) binumerates β◦α−1. Hence R ` Prα(pφqα)↔
Prβ(pφqβ) by (∗). Thus T ` Prβ(pφqβ).
(ii) Let φ, ψ ∈ FmlL. Since R ` f(pφ→ ψqα, pφ→ ψqβ), we get R ` Prα(pφ→ ψqα)↔
Prβ(pφ→ ψqβ). Similarly, R ` Prα(pφqα)↔ Prβ(pφqβ) and R ` Prα(pψqα)↔
Prβ(pψqβ). Since Prα(x) satisfies Lo¨b2α we get T ` Prβ(pφ→ ψqβ) →
(Prβ(pφqβ)→ Prβ(pψqβ)).
(iii) Let φ ∈ FmlL. As in (ii) we show (1) R ` Prα(pφqα) ↔ Prβ(pφqβ) and
(2) R ` Prα(pPrα(pφqα)qα) ↔ Prβ(pPrα(pφqα)qβ). Since Prα(x) satisfies
Lo¨b3α we get (3) T ` Prβ(pφqβ) → Prβ(pPrα(pφqα)qβ) by (1) and (2).
Application of Lo¨b1β to (1) then yields T ` Prβ(pPrα(pφqα)→ Prβ(pφqβ)qβ).
We now apply Lo¨b2β and get T ` Prβ(pPrα(pφqα)qβ)→ Prβ(pPrβ(pφqβ)qβ).
Combined with (3), T ` Prβ(pφqβ)→ Prβ(pPrβ(pφqβ)qβ) obtains.
If Prα(x) is a Σ01-numeration of α(T
`), then Prβ(x) numerates β(T`) by Lemma 4.4.
We can now show the desired result.35
35The invariance of Lo¨b’s Theorem as well as its formalised version with regard to acceptable
numberings can be proven in a similar way.
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Theorem 4.8 (Invariance of Go¨del’s Second Theorem). For all acceptable num-
berings α, theories T ⊇ R and arithmetical formulæ PrαT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s
conditions relative to α (for T ), T 6` ¬PrαT (p0 = S0qα).
Proof. Let γ be a fixed standard numbering which is a computable simulation.
By Theorem 3.12 we have α ∼ γ. Applying Lemma 4.7 yields a binumeration
f(x, y) of γ ◦ α−1 and a formula PrγT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions relative to
γ (for T ), such that R ` ¬PrαT (p0 = S0qα) ↔ ¬PrγT (p0 = S0qγ). Since γ is
standard, T 6` ¬PrγT (p0 = S0qγ). Thus T 6` ¬PrαT (p0 = S0qα).
The reader might reasonably object that the formulation of Theorem 4.8
already presupposes the employed provability predicates to satisfy Lo¨b’s con-
ditions. Since these conditions are specifically isolated to enable the schematic
“modal reasoning” sufficient to prove Go¨del’s Second Theorem (or more gener-
ally, Lo¨b’s Theorem), what then does the above theorem really tell us about the
invariance of Go¨del’s Second Theorem with regard to numberings? It should
be noted that Lo¨b’s conditions alone do not suffice to prove Go¨del’s Second
Theorem. What is additionally needed is the Diagonal Lemma. This theorem
however is again sensitive to the employed numbering (see 2.4) and thus, even
the assumption of Lo¨b’s conditions does not save us from complications caused
by varying numberings.
Based on this observation, a different route can be chosen to prove the
above theorem: the generalised version of the Diagonal Lemma (see 4.5) yields
a fixed point for ¬PrT (x). Then Go¨del’s Second Theorem can be proven by the
usual “modal reasoning”, without recourse to any properties other than Lo¨b’s
conditions.
Yet, no information about the existence of provability predicates satisfying
Lo¨b’s conditions with regard to varying numberings is provided by Theorem 4.8.
As a result, the reader might wonder how much C∀∗ [P∀∗T ] even extends the clas-
sical criterion C[PT ]. For it could be the case that only the typically employed,
standard numberings yield non-trivial36 provability predicates satisfying Lo¨b’s
conditions, rendering Theorem 4.8 a trivial extension of the standard Theo-
rem 2.2.
Indeed, the next theorem shows that every computable simulation α allows
the construction of a non-trivial provability predicate satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions
relative to α. This establishes C∀∗ [P∀∗T ] as well as the corresponding generalised
version of Go¨del’s Second Theorem as proper extensions of classical accounts
based on a specific numbering.
Theorem 4.9. For all computable simulations α and theories T extending
I∆0 + Ω1 or I∆0 + Exp,
37 there exists a formula PrαT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s con-
ditions relative to α (for T ) which numerates {α(φ) | T ` φ}.
Proof. Let γ be a standard numbering and PrγT a standard Σ
0
1-provability pred-
icate satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions relative to γ (for T ) and numerating γ(T`)
(see for instance (Wilkie & Paris, 1987) if T ⊇ I∆0 + Ω1 or (Rautenberg, 2006,
Chapter 7) if T ⊇ I∆0 + Exp). By Theorem 3.12 α ∼ γ. Lemma 4.7 then yields
36Note that also the formula x = x satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions.
37Let Ω1 ≡ ∀xy∃z o(x, y, z) where o(x, y, z) is a binumeration of the polynomially growing
function ω1(x, y) = xlog y , where log x = max{y | 2y ≤ x}. Let Exp ≡ ∀xy∃z e(x, y, z), where
e(x, y, z) is a binumeration of the exponentiation function.
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a formula PrαT (x) satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions relative to α (for T ), numerating
α(T`).
Despite its satisfaction of Lo¨b’s conditions as well as its numeration of T -
theorems, we believe that the provability predicate PrαT (x) obtained in Theo-
rem 4.9 hardly qualifies as being intensionally correct. Since according to the
proof of Lemma 4.4, PrαT (x) is of the form ∃z (f(z, x) ∧ PrγT (z)), with f being
a binumeration of α ◦ γ−1, the intensional correctness of PrαT (x) is unlikely to
hold, if made precise by a version of the resemblance criterion (see (Halbach &
Visser, 2014a, p. 676)). In the case that meaning postulates (see (Halbach &
Visser, 2014a, p. 676)) are employed as sufficient conditions for the expressibil-
ity of provability, it should be noted that computable equivalence is too weak
to preserve proof-theoretic properties which are not merely schematic.
To illustrate this point, let β0 be an acceptable numbering of E. Let h : N→
N be a strictly increasing, recursive but not T -provably total function. Define
β : E → N by setting38
β(φ) =
{
2 · h(β(χ)) if ∃χ such that φ ≡ χ_→ 0 = 0,
2 · β0(φ) + 1 otherwise.
Clearly β is injective and β ∼ β0. Furthermore, the function β(φ) 7→ β(φ →
0 = 0) is not T -provably total. Hence there does not exists a numeration
imp(x, y, z) of the graph of the function (β(φ), β(ψ)) 7→ β(φ → ψ) such that
T ` ∀xy∃z imp(x, y, z). The definition of β can be easily extended such that
the tracking functions under β of all the constructors ¬, ∧, →, etc. are not T -
provably total. But this might reasonably be taken as a minimal requirement for
an intensionally correct arithmetisation when resorting to the meaning postulate
approach.39
5 Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to re-examine the justification of the preva-
lent philosophical interpretation of Go¨del’s Second Theorem. Following Detlef-
sen (1986), such a justification consists of two steps: (1) Formulating necessary
conditions for expressing T -consistency and (2) proving that all L-sentences sat-
isfying these conditions are not derivable in T . We have argued that the classical
route employing Lo¨b’s conditions and the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b-theorem (2.2) is
incomplete. This is due to the dependence of the conditions on specific, ar-
bitrarily chosen, Go¨del numberings, disqualifying them as necessary meaning
postulates for expressing provability. In order to provide a satisfactory solu-
tion to (1), a numbering sensitive generalisation of Lo¨b’s conditions has been
introduced, devoid of the aforementioned deficiencies. That is, instead of as-
suming every formula expressing provability to satisfy Lo¨b’s conditions relative
to one specific numbering, only satisfaction of Lo¨b’s conditions relative to some
acceptable numbering is required. Once more, providing a necessary condition
of the acceptability of a numbering, namely its computability, is sufficient for
38This definition is based on the construction of g in (Heck, 2007).
39This discussion inevitably remains vague due to the absence of concrete meaning postu-
lates sufficient for an arithmetisation to be intensionally correct.
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a solution of (1). In order to obtain a notion of computability independent of
the specific representation of syntax, the framework used accommodates a wide
class of design choices. Finally, this provides us with a philosophically adequate
as well as formally precise solution for (1) (see C∀∗ [P∀∗T ] on page 7). Since (2)
exceeds the scope of the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b-theorem (2.2) as a result of weak-
ening the conditions in (1), we have proven a generalised version of Go¨del’s
Theorem (4.8), establishing its invariance with regard to acceptable number-
ings. As a result, (1) and (2) fix the gap detected in the classical route and
provide us with a more solid justification of the philosophical interpretations of
Go¨del’s Second Theorem.
The need to re-examine and strengthen the justification of respective philo-
sophical interpretations is however not restricted to Go¨del’s Second Theorem.
In general, when formulating metamathematical results, one commonly resorts
to certain arbitrary design choices, such as the representation of syntax, the
Go¨del numbering, the proof system, the choice of specific formulæ representing
certain syntactic properties, etc. However, these notions often do not occur in
the formulation of the result’s philosophical interpretation. The justification of
this interpretation hence crucially depends on the invariance of the result with
regard to the notions absent in its interpretation’s formulation. Such invariance
is usually assumed but rarely mathematically proven, thus rendering the jus-
tification of the respective metamathematical result insufficiently founded. In
addition to contributing to the justification of the classical philosophical reading
of Go¨del’s Second Theorem, the invariance of the following theorems with re-
gard to acceptable numberings has been established: the Diagonal Lemma (4.5),
both the semantic (4.1) and the syntactic (4.6) version of Tarski’s Theorem as
well as Lo¨b’s Theorem and its formalised counterpart (see footnote 35).
It should be noted that the notion of acceptability used in this paper is too
weak to ensure the invariance of metamathematical theorems which do not only
resort to schematic quantification. For instance, when employing a uniform
version of Lo¨b’s conditions (see for instance (Visser, 2016, p. 71)), Lemma 4.7
appears to be outside the scope of this paper’s methods. While Lemma 4.4 can
be converted into a uniform version such that R + “≤ is a linear ordering” `
∀xy f(x, y) → (φ(x) ↔ ψ(y)), the translation function binumerated by f is
not necessarily T -provably total. This is however a necessary ingredient for
proving the invariance regarding numberings along the lines of our proof of
Lemma 4.7. The same applies to the parametric version of the Diagonal Lemma
(see (Ha´jek & Pudla´k, 1998, Theorem III.2.1)), the free-variable version of Lo¨b’s
Theorem (see (Smorynski, 1977, Theorem 4.1.7)), etc. These remarks suggest
that invariance results of such theorems require a more restrictive notion of
acceptability, allowing further properties of the resulting translation functions
to be verified within T . A philosophically adequate account of acceptability of
numberings relative to a theory is thus called for.40
The above observation is closely related to another direction of research
into which the study of invariance may be extended. For instance, in addition
to Go¨del’s Second Theorem itself being invariant, one might reasonably also
require its proof and the process of arithmetisation to be independent of the
employed numbering. This would rule out intensionally incorrect provability
40This approach and the subsequent direction of research has also been suggested by Volker
Halbach.
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predicates such as those present in the proof of Theorem 4.8, as well as non-
standard proofs based on deviant numberings (see Lemma 4.5). As noted in
the discussion following Theorem 4.9, a stronger invariance claim such as this
is likely to require translation functions of numberings to preserve not only
necessary but sufficient, and thus more restrictive, conditions for expressing
provability or other syntactic properties. Once again, a more refined notion
of acceptability of numberings is needed. We believe that future work in this
direction may further elucidate to what extent the choice of numberings bears
on intensionality phenomena in metamathematics.
6 Appendix: Constructions of Deviant Num-
berings
We take here L-expressions to be represented as finite trees, i.e., the universe
of expressions E is generated by the constructors Ω+ = {‘S’, ‘ + ’, ‘ · ’, ‘′’, ‘ =
’, ‘¬’, ‘ ∧ ’, ‘∀’} from the alphabet Ω0 = {‘v’, ‘0’, ‘1’} (see Example 3.3.III).41
We first specify a numbering δ¬ of E such that the tracking functions of all
constructors of Ω+ other than ¬E are recursive and the set of (δ¬-codes of)
T-theorems is decidable, for any fixed consistent theory T ⊇ R proving the
commutative semiring axioms (see e.g. Ax1-Ax7 in (Kaye, 1991, p. 16f.)). For
technical convenience, we employ a derivability relation such that for every
formula φ we have T ` φ iff T ` ∀φ, where ∀φ denotes the universal closure of
φ.
The basic idea is to construct δ¬ such that all (δ¬-codes of) T -theorems can
be isolated from the remaining (δ¬-codes of) expressions of E by the decidable
property of parity. In order to do so, we first partition the even and odd numbers
into infinite decidable sets, each corresponding to a certain syntactic category.
Let 〈x, y〉 ≡ (x+y+1)(x+y+2)2 + y be the usual pairing function. We define the
following functions:
Θtm(x, y) = 10 · 〈x, y〉+ 1,
Λ=(x, y) = 8 · 〈x, y〉, Θ=(x, y) = 10 · 〈x, y〉+ 3,
Λ¬(x, y) = 8 · 〈x, y〉+ 2, Θ¬(x, y) = 10 · 〈x, y〉+ 5,
Λ∧(x, y) = 8 · 〈x, y〉+ 4, Θ∧(x, y) = 10 · 〈x, y〉+ 7,
Λ∀(x, y) = 8 · 〈x, y〉+ 6, Θ∀(x, y) = 10 · 〈x, y〉+ 9.
In what follows, we define δ¬ such that all (δ¬-codes of) terms are elements
of Θtm(N,N) = {Θtm(m,n) | m,n ∈ N} = 10N+1, all (δ¬-codes of) T -theorems
of the form s = t are elements of Λ=(N,N) = 8N, all (δ¬-codes of) expressions of
the form s = t which are not T -theorems are elements of Θ=(N,N) = 10N+3, all
(δ¬-codes of) of T -theorems of the form φ∧ψ are elements of Λ∧(N,N) = 8N+2,
etc. Since
Λ=(N,N) ∪ Λ¬(N,N) ∪ Λ∧(N,N) ∪ Λ∀(N,N) = 2N and
Θtm(N,N) ∪Θ=(N,N) ∪Θ¬(N,N) ∪Θ∧(N,N) ∪Θ∀(N,N) = 2N+ 1
41For technical convenience we add the constant symbol ‘1’ to L.
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all δ¬-codes of T -theorems are even, while the δ¬-codes of all other expres-
sions are odd. Thus T ` φ iff δ¬(φ) is even, for every sentence φ. Using Σ1-
completeness it is then easy to check that the ∆0-formula Pr(x) ≡ ∃y < x x =
2 · y satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions relative to δ¬ (for T ) and T ` ¬Pr(p0 = S0qδ¬).
However, Pr(x) will not define the set of T -theorems, since not every even num-
ber will code a T -theorem. We construct a ∆0-formula below which in addition
to satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions also binumerates the set of T -theorems.
To begin with, we number the “term-expressions” of E, i.e., we define a
numbering of Etm = E{‘0’, ‘1’, ‘v’, ‘S’, ‘ + ’, ‘ · ’, ‘′’}. On the term level any
standard numbering will do. For definiteness we first assign 0E 7→ 1, 1E 7→ 2,
vE 7→ 3 and then define:
• the tracking function of SE: n 7→ 21 · 3n;
• the tracking function of ′E: n 7→ 22 · 3n;
• the tracking function of +E: (n,m) 7→ 23 · 3n · 5m;
• the tracking function of ·E: (n,m) 7→ 24 · 3n · 5m.
By the universal property of Etm, this induces a numbering δtm of Etm. In order
to satisfy the aforementioned desired properties, we set δ¬0 (s) = Θ
tm(0, δtm(s)),
for each s ∈ Etm. Clearly, the tracking functions of SE, ′E, +E and ·E are
recursive relative to δ¬0 . The arithmetisation of the syntactic properties of and
operations on terms proceeds as usual. In particular, the property of being a
(δ¬0 -code of a) term is decidable. In order to extend δ
¬
0 such that also =E has a
recursive tracking function, we first show that for any given expressions s, t, it
is decidable whether or not T ` s = t (with s, t being possibly open terms).
Since T is Π01-sound and proves the axioms of a commutative semiring, to
each L-term s(x1, . . . , xl) there corresponds a unique polynomial ps ∈ N[x1, . . . , xl]
such that ps = pt iff T ` s = t. In order to show the decidability of T ` s = t,
the rough idea is to define a rewriting system which effectively reduces each
term s(x1, . . . , xl) to its unique normal form ps. Since commutativity blocks
the termination of such systems, we instead define a class-rewriting system
which essentially operates on AC-congruence classes of terms, with AC being
the equational theory consisting of the associativity and commutativity axioms
of both + and ·. This gives rise to a system with the following properties:
1. for each term there exists a unique normal form up to permutations under
associativity and commutativity,
2. each normal form s′ of s is a term and T ` s = s′,
3. normal forms of terms can be effectively computed,
4. for any two s, t and respective normal forms s′, t′: T ` s = t iff s′ ∼AC t′.
We first define the ordinary term rewriting system R, consisting of the fol-
lowing rules:
(i) t · (u+ v)→ t · u+ t · v
(ii) St→ t+ 1
(iii) 1 · t→ t
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(iv) 0 · t→ 0
(v) t+ 0→ t
In allowing the rewriting of a term by means of rewriting any AC-equivalent
term, R is thus extended to the class-rewriting system R/AC. In order to show
that this system terminates, let A = {n ≥ 2 | n ∈ N} and consider the following
polynomial weight functions:
(a) 0A = 2
(b) 1A = 2
(c) SA = X + 4
(d) +A = X + Y + 1
(e) ·A = XY
All polynomials (a)-(e) satisfy associativity and commutativity. Furthermore
the polynomials Fl,r (i.e., the result of subtracting the weight of the right hand
side from the left hand side of a given rule) of the rules (i)-(v) are X − 1, 1, X,
2X − 2 and 3 respectively, which are all strictly positive (over A). Thus R/AC
is terminating (see (Terese, 2003, Chapter 6)).
Furthermore, R is left-linear. The critical pairs of R are of the form (u +
v, 1 · u + 1 · v), (0, 0 · u + 0 · v) and (t · u, t · u + t · 0). It can easily be checked
that they converge, for instance, 1 · u + 1 · v → u + 1 · v → u + v. Hence the
class-rewriting system R/AC has the Church-Rosser property modulo AC (see
(Dershowitz & Jouannaud, 1990, Chapter 7)).
We may conclude that for each term, R/AC effectively computes a unique
normal form up to permutations under associativity and commutativity. In
order to decide whether or not T ` s = t for two terms s, t, one proceeds as
follows: first effectively rewrite s and t into their respective normal forms s′ and
t′. Then check whether or not s′ ∼AC t′. Since the word problem for AC is
decidable and T ` s = t iff s′ ∼AC t′, the decidability of T ` s = t obtains.
This decision process can be resembled on the δ¬0 -codes of terms in the usual
way, yielding a corresponding decidable arithmetical property PrEqu(m,n).
In order to extend δ¬0 to a numbering of E satisfying the desired properties,
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we exploit the fact that for any given expressions φ, ψ and x, whether or not
φ ∧ ψ and ∀xφ are T -provable is already fully determined by the T -provability
of φ and ψ (and by the decidable fact of whether or not x is a variable). Clearly
this does not hold for ¬, as neither T ` ¬φ nor T 6` ¬φ are entailed by T 6` φ.
For this reason, ¬E will not have a recursive tracking function under δ¬.
Let {χn | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of T -provable
formulæ which are of the form ¬φ and let {νn | n ∈ N} be an enumeration
without repetitions of expressions of the form ¬φ which are not T -provable
(including not well-formed expressions). Set δ¬0 (χn) = Λ
¬(0, n) and δ¬0 (νn) =
Θ¬(0, n). We now successively extend the numbering δ¬0 of E
tm ∪ {¬φ | φ ∈ E}
42For convenience, we take E here to be a partial algebra, where the operations SE, +E,
·E and ′E are only defined on expressions generated by the former operations. That is, the
term-building constructors are only defined on (possibly non-well-formed) terms. The above
numbering can however easily be modified to allow the domain to be the standard algebra E.
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in ω-many steps to a numbering of E, by defining a function δ¬i+1 for each i < ω
as follows:
dom(δ¬i+1) = dom(δ
¬
i ) ∪ {φ ∧ ψ | φ, ψ ∈ dom(δ¬i )} ∪ {∀sψ | s, ψ ∈ dom(δ¬i )}∪
∪ {s = t | s, t ∈ dom(δ¬i )};
δ¬i+1(φ) = δ
¬
i (φ), if φ ∈ dom(δ¬i );
δ¬i+1(s = t) =
{
Λ=(δ¬i (s), δ
¬
i (t)), if s, t ∈ dom(δ¬i ), T ` s = t,
Θ=(δ¬i (s), δ
¬
i (t)), if s, t ∈ dom(δ¬i ), T 6` s = t;
δ¬i+1(φ ∧ ψ) =
{
Λ∧(δ¬i (φ), δ
¬
i (ψ)), if φ, ψ ∈ dom(δ¬i ), T ` φ, ψ,
Θ∧(δ¬i (φ), δ
¬
i (ψ)), if φ, ψ ∈ dom(δ¬i ), T 6` φ or T 6` ψ;
δ¬i+1(∀sψ) =
{
Λ∀(δ¬i (s), δ
¬
i (ψ)), if s, ψ ∈ dom(δ¬i ), s is a variable, T ` ψ,
Θ∀(δ¬i (s), δ
¬
i (ψ)), if s, ψ ∈ dom(δ¬i ), s is not a variable or T 6` ψ.
Finally, we set δ¬ =
⋃
i<ω δ
¬
i , with dom(δ
¬) =
⋃
i<ω dom(δ
¬
i ). By definition
of the functions Θtm, Λ=, Θ=, etc., δ¬ is an injective function and thus a
numbering of E. In order to show that {δ¬(φ) | T ` φ} can be binumerated by
a ∆0-formula, we define
Pr(x) ≡∃s Seq(s) ∧ x = (s)Lh(s) ∧ ∀i ≤ Lh(s)
(∃n (s)i = Λ¬(0, n)
∨ ∃p, q Term(p) ∧ Term(q) ∧ PrEqu(p, q) ∧ (s)i = Λ=(p, q)
∨ ∃j, k < i (s)i = Λ∧((s)j , (s)k)
∨ ∃j < i, y ≤ (s)i Var(y) ∧ (s)i = Λ∀(y, (s)j)
)
.
Clearly, Pr(x) defines {δ¬(φ) | T ` φ}. As we have seen above, PrEqu(x, y) can
be taken to be a ∆0-formula, as well as Seq(x),Term(x) and Var(x). It remains
to show that the variable s can be bounded. To do so, construct a ∆0-definable
height function h(x) such that h(δ¬(φ)) = #{ψ | ψ is a subformula of φ}. Then
the length of the sequence (coded by) s can be bounded by the number of
subformulæ of the theorem (coded by) x, i.e., by h(x). Thus Pr(x) can be taken
to be ∆0.
We conclude by showing the tracking functions of all operations of Ω+ other
than ¬E to be recursive relative to δ¬. As above, it can be shown that dom(δ¬i ),
for all i < ω as well as dom(δ¬) is decidable. Moreover, s is a variable and T ` φ
are decidable (relative to δ¬). To then compute, for instance, the tracking func-
tion ∧˙ : dom(δ¬)→ N of ∧E, one first decides for a given input (m,n) whether
or not Pr(m) and Pr(n). If both hold, then the output is Λ∧(m,n). If not, the
output is Θ∧(m,n). Hence, the tracking function ∧˙ is recursive. Showing the
recursiveness of the remaining tracking functions proceeds in a similar way.
We now construct a numbering δ∗ of E such that the tracking function of
¬E is recursive and the set of (δ∗-codes of) T-theorems is decidable, for any
fixed consistent theory T ⊇ R. As opposed to the above construction, we here
employ the standard derivability relation such that only closed sentences are T -
theorems. We then use the fact that membership of ¬φ in the sets {φ | T ` φ},
{φ | T ` ¬φ} and {φ | T 6` φ, T 6` ¬φ} is already fully determined by the
respective membership of φ. This does however not hold for φ ∧ ψ, since for
instance T ` ¬(φ ∧ ¬φ) but T 6` ¬(φ ∧ φ), for any T -independent φ. Hence,
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in what follows, δ∗(φ ∧ ψ) is not defined along the lines of δ∗(¬φ) and thus ∧E
does not have a recursive tracking function under δ∗.
Let {χn | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of T -theorems which
are not of the form ¬φ, let {µn | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions
of T -refutable sentences which are not of the form ¬φ and let {νn | n ∈ N} be
an enumeration without repetitions of L-expressions not of the form ¬φ which
are neither T -provable nor T -refutable (including non-well-formed expressions).
First, we set δ∗0(χn) = 3·〈0, n〉, δ∗0(µn) = 3·〈0, n〉+1 and δ∗0(νn) = 3·〈0, n〉+2,
with dom(δ∗0) = E \ {¬φ | φ ∈ E}. Then we extend δ∗0 to a numbering of E in
ω-many steps by defining δ∗i+1 for each i < ω:
dom(δ∗i+1) = dom(δ
∗
i ) ∪ {¬φ | φ ∈ dom(δ∗i )}
δ∗i+1(φ) = δ
∗
i (φ), if φ ∈ dom(δ∗i )
δ∗i+1(¬φ) =

3 · 〈i+ 1, j〉, if T ` ¬φ, T 6` φ and δ∗i (φ) = 3 · 〈i, j〉+ 1
3 · 〈i+ 1, j〉+ 1, if T ` φ and δ∗i (φ) = 3 · 〈i, j〉
3 · 〈i+ 1, j〉+ 2, if T 6` φ, T 6` ¬φ and δ∗i (φ) = 3 · 〈i, j〉+ 2
Finally, we set δ∗ =
⋃
i<ω δ
∗
i , with dom(δ
∗) =
⋃
i<ω dom(δ
∗
i ). It is easy to
check that δ∗ is indeed a numbering of E. We now show that the ∆0-formula
Pr(x) ≡ ∃y < x x = 3 · y defines {δ∗(φ) | T ` φ}. First, we define the height
function
h¬(φ) =
{
h¬(ξ) + 1 if φ ≡ ¬ξ, for some L-expression ξ,
0 otherwise.
Then it is easy to show by induction that for every T -theorem φ we have δ∗(φ) =
3 · 〈h¬(φ), n〉 such that φ ≡ ¬ · · · ¬︸ ︷︷ ︸
h¬(φ)-times
χn if h
¬(φ) is even and φ ≡ ¬ · · · ¬︸ ︷︷ ︸
h¬(φ)-times
µn
if h¬(φ) is odd. Since there is a 1 : 1-correspondence between T -theorems φ and
pairs of natural numbers 〈h¬(φ), n〉, the set of δ∗-codes of T -theorems is exactly
3N.
To show that the tracking function of ¬E under δ∗ is recursive proceeds as
in the case of δ¬.
We conclude by specifying a numbering δ∀ of E such that the tracking func-
tions of all constructors of Ω+ other than ∀E are recursive and {δ∀(φ) | N |= φ} is
decidable. As in the case of δ¬, we partition the natural numbers into decidable
infinite sets corresponding to certain syntactic categories:
Υtm(x, y) = 15 · 〈x, y〉+ 2,
Λ=(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉, Θ=(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉+ 1, Υ=(x, y) = 15 · 〈x, y〉+ 5,
Λ¬(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉+ 3, Θ¬(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉+ 4, Υ¬(x, y) = 15 · 〈x, y〉+ 8,
Λ∧(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉+ 6, Θ∧(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉+ 7, Υ∧(x, y) = 15 · 〈x, y〉+ 11,
Λ∀(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉+ 9, Θ∀(x, y) = 12 · 〈x, y〉+ 10, Υ∀(x, y) = 15 · 〈x, y〉+ 14.
In what follows we define δ∀ such that all numbers of true sentences of the
form s = t are elements of Λ=(N,N) = {Λ=(m,n) | m,n ∈ N} = 12N, all
numbers of true sentences of the form φ∧ψ are elements of Λ∧(N,N) = 12N+3,
etc. Since
Λ=(N,N)∪˙Λ¬(N,N)∪˙Λ∧(N,N)∪˙Λ∀(N,N) = 3N,
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all (δ∀-codes of) true sentences are elements of 3N = {3 · n | n ∈ N}. Similarly,
all (δ∀-codes of) false sentences are elements of 3N + 1, and all (δ∀-codes of)
expressions which are not sentences are elements of 3N + 2. Thus the formula
Pr(x) ≡ ∃y < x x = 3 · y satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions relative to δ∀ (for T ) and
T ` ¬Pr(p0 = S0qδ∀), for any sound T . Moreover, the set {δ∀(φ) | N |= φ} is
definable by a ∆0-formula.
In a similar way to the above definitions of δ¬ and δ∗, we define δ∀ by
exploiting the fact that the membership of ¬φ and φ ∧ ψ in {φ | N |= φ},
{φ | N 6|= φ and φ is a sentence} and {φ | φ is not a sentence} is already fully
determined by the respective memberships of φ and ψ. This however does not
hold for ∀E, since there are expressions φ, ψ such that both N |= ∀xφ and
N |= ∀xψ but φ ∈ {φ | N |= φ} and ψ ∈ {φ | φ is not a sentence}. Hence, in
what follows, δ∀(∀xφ) is not defined along the lines of δ∀(¬φ) and δ∀(φ ∧ ψ),
resulting in the non-recursiveness of the tracking function of ∀E relative to δ∀.
Let {χn | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repetitions of true sentences
which are of the form ∀xφ, let {νn | n ∈ N} be an enumeration without repeti-
tions of false sentences which are of the form ∀xφ, and let {µn | n ∈ N} be an
enumeration without repetitions of expressions of the form ∀xφ which are not
sentences (with x and φ being L-expressions).
We first define δ∀0 (s) = Υ
tm(0, δtm(s)) for s ∈ Etm and δ∀0 (χn) = Λ∀(0, n),
δ∀0 (νn) = Θ
∀(0, n), δ∀0 (µn) = Υ
∀(0, n), with dom(δ∀0 ) = E
tm ∪ {∀xφ | x, φ ∈ E}.
As above we extend δ∀0 to a numbering of E, by defining δ
∀
i+1 for each i < ω:
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dom(δ∀i+1) = dom(δ
∀
i ) ∪ {s = t | s, t ∈ dom(δ∀i )} ∪ {¬φ | φ ∈ dom(δ∀i )}∪
∪ {φ ∧ ψ | φ, ψ ∈ dom(δ∀i )};
δ∀i+1(φ) = δ
∀
i (φ), if φ ∈ dom(δ∀i );
δ∀i+1(s = t) =

Λ=(δ∀i (s), δ
∀
i (t)), if s, t ∈ dom(δ∀i ), s, t are closed terms, N |= s = t,
Θ=(δ∀i (s), δ
∀
i (t)), if s, t ∈ dom(δ∀i ), s, t are closed terms, N 6|= s = t,
Υ=(δ∀i (s), δ
∀
i (t)), if s, t ∈ dom(δ∀i ), s or t is not a closed term;
δ∀i+1(¬φ) =

Λ¬(0, δ∀i (φ)), if φ ∈ dom(δ∀i ),N 6|= φ,
Θ¬(0, δ∀i (φ)), if φ ∈ dom(δ∀i ),N |= φ,
Υ¬(0, δ∀i (φ)), if φ ∈ dom(δ∀i ), φ is not a sentence;
δ∀i+1(φ ∧ ψ) =

Λ∧(δ∀i (φ), δ
∀
i (ψ)), if φ, ψ ∈ dom(δ∀i ),N |= φ, ψ,
Θ∧(δ∀i (φ), δ
∀
i (ψ)), if φ, ψ ∈ dom(δ∀i ),N 6|= φ or N 6|= ψ,
Υ∧(δ∀i (φ), δ
∀
i (ψ)), if φ ∈ dom(δ∀i ), φ or ψ is not a sentence.
Finally, we define δ∀ =
⋃
i<ω δ
∀
i , with dom(δ
∀) =
⋃
i<ω dom(δ
∀
i ). Showing
that δ∀ is a numbering of E such that {δ∀(φ) | N |= φ} can be defined by a
∆0-formula and the tracking functions of all operations of Ω
+ other than ∀E
are recursive under δ∀ proceeds as in the case of δ¬ above.
The deviant numberings δ¬ and δ∀ can be seen as “maximally natural” and
designate the transition from invariance to deviant results: as soon as the notion
of a computable simulation is weakened by giving up the requirement that the
tracking functions of ¬E or ∀E are recursive, Theorem 4.8 fails.
43We use the convention here that N 6|= φ implies that φ is a sentence.
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